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 A central argument in Just and Unjust Wars is Michael Walzer’s reconstruction of 
the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) and its implications for the risks that just warriors 
must take to minimize harm to civilians. In 2009, Walzer and co-author Avishai Margalit 
revisited the topic in an exchange with Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin.1 In this paper I 
shall defend a version of Walzer’s conclusion on grounds somewhat different than his 
own. 
 The DDE concerns foreseen but unintended effects of intentional action and, in its 
most general form, it partially or wholly exonerates agents from blame for the unintended 
bad effects of permissible intended actions, even if the agent foresees the unintended bad 
consequences. In military affairs, it takes the form of exonerating soldiers for the 
unintended bad consequences—chiefly, damage to civilians and civilian objects2—of 
otherwise-permitted violence. Soldiers cannot target civilians, but they can target military 
objectives even when they know that civilians will inevitably suffer harm, provided that 
the civilian harm isn’t disproportionate to the military advantage. Under the right 
                                                 
1
 Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer, “Israel: Civilians and Combatants,” New York Review of Books, 
May 14, 2009; Asa Kasher and Major General Amos Yadlin, with a reply by Margalit and Walzer, “ ‘Israel 
& the Rules of War: An Exchange,” New York Review of Books, June 11, 2009. I presented this paper at the 
conference on The Enduring Legacy of Just and Unjust Wars at NYU's Tikvah Center, the Wharton 
School, the Tel Aviv University political science department, and the University of Michigan international 
law workshop. I am grateful to the participants for their helpful comments. 
2
 But also the natural environment, objects of cultural and historical value, and objects like dams that might 
cause danger. 
2 
conditions the DDE exonerates soldiers (morally and legally) for unintended civilian 
harm, even when the soldiers see it coming.  
Walzer argues that merely not intending civilian harm isn’t good enough: soldiers 
must intend not to harm civilians. The former seemingly allows soldiers to purchase 
blamelessness on the cheap, simply by narrowing their intentions. Knowing that an attack 
will hit both military and civilian objects, the soldier must take care to intend only to hit 
the military target, not the civilians. That seems like an absurd and dishonest mental 
game. How do you avoid war crimes? Close your eyes, take a deep breath, concentrate 
hard, and refocus your intentions. Then go ahead and do what you were about to do 
anyway. Intending not to harm civilians, as Walzer explains it, requires action and not 
thought alone. Soldiers must take precautions, including risky precautions if necessary, to 
safeguard civilians.  
He illustrates with a World War I case where a soldier (Frank Richards) was 
tasked with opening cellar doors in France and throwing hand grenades into the cellars in 
case German soldiers were there. Richards worried that civilians might be hiding in the 
cellars, and decided to call out a warning before he threw in the grenades, so that civilians 
could evacuate. Otherwise, Richards thought, he might be committing “innocent murder.” 
Of course, if there were German soldiers hidden in the cellar, they could come out 
shooting when they heard the warning—so Richards was taking on extra personal risk to 
spare civilians.3 In Walzer’s view Frank Richards “was surely doing the right thing when 
he shouted his warning. He was acting as a moral man ought to act; his is not an example 
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 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 152. 
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of fighting heroically, above and beyond the call of duty, but simply of fighting well. It is 
what we expect of soldiers.”4 
 The issue of “innocent murder” is a fundamental one, particularly in asymmetrical 
conflicts, where one side possesses technologies that permit it to destroy the other with 
almost no risk to its own forces, but at the cost of extra civilian casualties among the 
enemy’s population. For brevity’s sake, I will call civilians from the adversary’s group 
“enemy civilians.”  This emphatically does not mean they are enemy fighters. If they are, 
they become legitimate targets. In the functional sense relevant to my topic, civilians who 
take up arms are not really civilians. Genuine enemy civilians, by contrast, may not even 
be enemies: for all we know they are opponents or victims of their own government 
whose sympathies lie with the invaders. Some are too young for meaningful enmities; 
some are infants. All I mean by the shorthand term “enemy civilians” is that they are 
civilians who belong to “them” rather than “us.” 
 In 2005, Kasher and Yadlin published an article in which they asserted a 
difference between civilians who are a state’s own nationals or under the “effective 
control” of the state, and civilians who are not.5 Kasher and Yadlin argue that soldiers 
must take risks to spare the former, but not the latter. In their formulation, minimizing 
injury to the former is a higher moral priority to a military than minimizing casualties to 
its own troops; but minimizing casualties to its own troops—force protection for short—
is a higher priority than minimizing casualties to enemy civilians not under the military’s 
                                                 
4
 Ibid. p. 154. 
5
 Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin, “Assassination and Preventive Killing,” SAIS Review 25 (Winter-Spring 
2005): 49-51. The article is a shortened form of a longer article; I use it because it is the version Margalit 
and Walzer criticize. 
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effective control.6 To think otherwise, Kasher and Yadlin claim, is “immoral,” because a 
“combatant is a citizen in uniform. In Israel, quite often, he is a conscript….” The state 
has an obligation to protect its own citizens and those in occupied territories; it has no 
such responsibilities to other civilians.7 And its soldiers are its citizens. 
 Margalit and Walzer respond that the nationality of civilians is irrelevant; the sole 
relevant distinction is that between combatants and non-combatants. They argue their 
case through a series of hypotheticals. Suppose Hezbollah fighters succeed in capturing a 
kibbutz filled with Israeli citizens, and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) must recapture it. 
Troops must take precautions to minimize civilian casualties, and that might mean 
assuming personal risks; that is what we expect of soldiers. But what if the hostages are 
not Israelis but pro-Israel U.S. Jews who have come to the kibbutz to support Israel? 
Under Kasher and Yadlin’s formula, IDF troops would not need to take the extra risks, 
but that seems like an intuitively wrong result, premising the difference on nothing but an 
accident of nationality.8 Intuitively, the IDF should take the same risks in both cases. If 
that conclusion is right, consider a hypothetical in which the U.S. Jews are not 
sympathizers but protestors against Israeli policies. The sole difference between this and 
the previous hypothetical is the ideological beliefs of the U.S. non-combatants; and, 
presumably, these must not matter to the military. So the third case must be treated on a 
par with the first and second. 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., p. 49. The qualification about effective control is Kasher and Yadlin’s acknowledgment that an 
occupying army owes protective obligations to enemy civilians in occupied territory; “effective control” is 
the legal test of occupation under Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Convention Annex. 
7
 Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
8
 Kasher and Yadlin reject the hypotheticals because the kibbutz is under effective Israeli control, being 
within the territory of Israel; Margalit and Walzer respond that if it was under effective Israeli control the 
IDF would not have to fight its way in. I take it that Margalit and Walzer have the better of this round of 
the exchange. 
5 
Finally, suppose that the kibbutzniks successfully evacuated shortly before the 
Hezbollah attack, and that Hezbollah had moved in civilian villagers from South 
Lebanon, to use as human shields. Here, the only difference from the preceding 
hypothetical is that the civilians are Lebanese nationals rather than unsympathetic U.S. 
nationals. Surely, that fact cannot matter to the moral obligations of the soldiers—both 
are foreign nationals sharing (let’s suppose) similar ideological views. Margalit and 
Walzer conclude that the IDF troops must take the same risks (whatever those may be) in 
all four cases. If so, Kasher and Yadlin’s distinction between “our” civilians and “theirs” 
cannot survive. 
 There were additional rounds to the debate, as Kasher, Yadlin, and others went 
back and forth with Margalit and Walzer in subsequent issues of the New York Review of 
Books (where the English version of Margalit and Walzer’s article was first published). I 
will bring in some of the additional arguments later in this paper, but for the moment let 
this suffice to set the stage. 
Why the problem matters 
The possibility of low-risk or risk-free warfare leapt into prominence on August 
6, 1945, when the Enola Gay dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. But the same 
possibility exists with conventional weapons. In the first Persian Gulf war, Iraqi fire 
killed only 200 coalition fighters, as compared with Iraqi losses in the tens of thousands. 
In the Kosovo war, NATO suffered no combat deaths, while its air strikes killed at least a 
few hundred Yugoslav army troops and more than a thousand—perhaps several 
thousand—civilians. In Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli Defense Force suffered ten 
6 
deaths (some by friendly fire) while killing hundreds of Hamas fighters and more than a 
thousand Gazan civilians. 
 Kosovo was the first conflict where the dilemma between risks to the military and 
risks to civilians became a prominent public issue. NATO aircraft bombed from a high 
altitude, to avoid the risk of anti-aircraft fire. Reportedly, the result was less precision and 
higher civilian casualties than low-altitude bombing. 
 The deadly trade-off between military and civilian risk becomes even more 
pronounced in so-called fourth generation warfare between regular forces with superior 
technology and non-state adversaries who live, work, and fight in the midst of civilians. 
Here, state forces face a terrible decision that appears at every level of combat, from 
overall strategy to individual soldiers’ decisions on a house by house basis.9 Facing fire 
from a house in an urban neighborhood, state forces can obliterate the house from a safe 
distance through artillery or air strikes, or they can send their own soldiers into the house 
with rules of engagement (ROEs) that strictly forbid wholesale or remote fire that 
endangers civilians. 
 If ever there was an appropriate use of the overworked phrase “existential 
dilemma,” this is it. Should soldiers expose themselves to greater risk—or should their 
headquarters writing ROEs require them to do so—in order to diminish civilian 
casualties?10 Does the morality of warfare demand it of them? To what degree? 
                                                 
9
 Of course the state’s adversaries face terrible decisions as well about how much they will risk their own 
communities in order to wage their struggle. I won’t discuss their moral issues in this paper, but that is not 
meant to signify that I think them less important than the state’s issues. 
10
 This is an important difference. Intuitively, it may seem like too much to ask of the individual soldier to 
make the decision in the stress of combat. It makes more sense to focus on the author of ROEs as the 
decision-maker—not because it would be emotionally easier or morally less weighty to impose danger on 
his or her own troops, but because the officer in headquarters is in a calmer environment for reflection. 
Furthermore, the soldier himself or herself has what philosophers call “first-personal reasons” for self-
preference—as does everyone, of course. Without in any way suggesting that I am more important “in 
7 
The laws of war provide no direct answer to these questions—they never 
explicitly address the question of how much risk soldiers must assume to minimize 
“collateral” civilian casualties.11 International humanitarian law requires soldiers to do 
everything feasible to avoid unintended civilian casualties, but it never defines “feasible.” 
It represents the question of how much risk soldiers must take to spare civilians in less 
direct terms, namely what weight force protection carries as a “concrete and direct 
military advantage” of an operation. The more weight force protection carries, the more 
unintended civilian casualties will be permissible under a proportionality test. Force 
protection cannot have absolute weight, however, and soldiers cannot do anything it takes 
to minimize risks to themselves; if force protection had absolute weight, what would be 
the point of a proportionality requirement? In Gary Solis’s words, “an attacker with 
superior arms would be free to annihilate all opposition with overwhelming firepower 
and call any civilian casualties collateral.”12 It follows that soldiers cannot offload all the 
risks of warfare onto civilians. The law does not quantify how much risk soldiers can 
transfer to civilians. Because the legal details are not my principal concern, I place them 
in an appendix to the paper. 
                                                                                                                                                 
God’s eyes” than you, I can prefer my life to yours, and vice-versa. Placing the decision in the hands of a 
third party takes the structurally built-in first personal reason out of the equation. 
11
 I mean the usual by “collateral” casualties: casualties of attacks other than the intended target of those 
attacks. For the record, I dislike the euphemism “collateral damage,” which seems like a linguistic 
obfuscation designed to make something tragic and terrible sound antiseptic, technical, and minor. But the 
lawyers’ term “incidental” damage, used in the proportionality formula of Article 51(5)(b) of AP I, is even 
worse. The best usage, on grounds of precision as well as straight talk, would be “unintended” rather than 
“collateral” or “incidental.” 
 For important discussions of the law concerning risk-taking to minimize civilian casualties, see 
Eyal Benvenisti, “Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare Civilians,” Israel Law Review 39 (2006): 
81-109, and Benvenisti, “The Law on Asymmetric Warfare,” in Mahnoush Arsanjani et al., eds., Looking 
to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Riesman (Martinus Nijhoff, 20100, PP. 
931-950. 
12
 Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), p. 285. 
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A more straightforward legal question is whether the minimum necessary 
precautions soldiers take to spare civilians, including risks they assume, are different 
when the civilians are their own or their enemy’s. Here, the answer is indisputably no: 
nothing in the laws of war distinguishes non-combatant civilians into different classes 
based on nationality, and to give the same legal words different meanings based on a 
nationality distinction the law does not recognize is dishonest interpretation. 
I shall argue that these law of war answers are the right answers, and thus that 
Walzer’s requirement that if necessary soldiers take risks to minimize civilian 
casualties—either sides’ civilian casualties—is right. 
The Basic Scenario 
To fix ideas, let’s assume a situation of urban warfare in which soldiers or their 
commanders are invading a city where enemy irregulars are scattered throughout civilian 
neighborhoods. The invaders are choosing between two tactics, which I will name Close 
Engagement and Distant Engagement. As the names suggest, Close Engagement requires 
soldiers to engage the enemy at relatively close quarters, perhaps going house to house, 
with ROEs requiring them to hold fire when innocent civilians are present, except in 
unmistakable cases of self-defense. Distant Engagement allows them to attack the enemy 
from a distance, through artillery, aircraft, drones or the like. Let’s suppose what is 
almost certainly the case: that Distant Engagement is less discriminating than Close 
Engagement.13 If the invaders choose Distant Engagement, entire buildings will be 
obliterated, and if innocent civilians are in or around them, they will be hurt even though 
that’s not the intention. Call the situation I’ve just described the “Basic Scenario.” 
                                                 
13
 Distant Engagement could theoretically be more discriminating than Close Engagement if the soldiers 
possess drones with science-fiction capabilities. But let’s say no science fiction. 
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Obviously there are other scenarios that raise parallel questions, for example the Kosovo 
issue of whether bomber pilots should fly low (Close Engagement) or high (Distant 
Engagement). 
 Pause for a moment. In our Basic Scenario, soldiers or their officers confront a 
choice between two tactics. Of course those are never the only choices—the army could 
also withdraw, or stand pat. Perhaps a unit taking fire from a civilian building can detour 
around the building rather than engaging the enemy. We should not forget these options, 
because pretending that Close Engagement and Distant Engagement are the only 
possibilities imports a conception of military necessity that may be artificial.  
If it fights, though, the army must do so either at close quarters or at a distance, 
and we are supposing that both are operationally feasible. How are we to describe this 
choice? Words matter. We can describe choosing Distant Engagement as soldiers 
offloading risk onto innocent civilians, as I have. But offloading risk onto innocent 
civilians sounds dishonorable and cowardly. Or we can describe choosing Close 
Engagement as soldiers braving extra risk to spare innocent civilians—as I also have. 
That sounds like exceptional courage. Both descriptions carry semantic freight that begs 
the moral question one way or the other. One makes the soldiers sound like cowards, the 
other like heroes. They are either above or below the line of duty. And yet these are the 
only choices. What’s going on? 
 The problem is simply that we don’t know which choice represents the baseline. 
Knowing that would solve the initial problem. If taking chances to protect the innocent 
represents our baseline expectation of soldiers, Distant Engagement discreditably 
offloads soldier risk onto the innocent. But if the baseline expectation is force protection, 
10 
Close Engagement goes above and beyond the line of duty. It seems as though we cannot 
even describe the problem without a solution. 
 Once we notice this difficulty, we can at least guard ourselves against the trap that 
language lays. Our discussion should not assume that either tactic represents the baseline. 
I will continue to talk about soldiers transferring risks to civilians or assuming risks to 
spare civilians, but without meaning to suggest that the former is automatically 
dishonorable or the latter automatically heroic. I would ask the reader to refrain from 
reading value-judgments into these descriptions that I explicitly want to bracket while we 
examine the problem of risk transfer and force protection. 
For the record, two questions are on the table: 
1. Must soldiers take on avoidable personal risks in order to minimize 
civilian casualties? In the Basic Scenario, this means choosing Close 
Engagement over Distant Engagement (other things being equal). 
2. May soldiers take fewer risks to minimize enemy civilian casualties than 
morality requires for “friendly” civilians? That is the question debated 
by Kasher/Yadlin and Margalit/Walzer.  
To keep the questions distinct, it will be useful to think about question 1 in cases 
where the civilians are “friendlies”—so the question becomes whether soldiers must take 
on avoidable personal risks to minimize casualties to their own civilians. Suppose that 
morality requires soldiers to take a certain level of risk to spare their own civilians who, 
for whatever reason, are caught in the battle space. Call this the minimally acceptable 
care soldiers owe to their own civilians. Question 2 can then be rephrased as whether 
11 
they must take that same minimally acceptable care to spare enemy civilians in the battle 
space.  
Of course, soldiers or their commanders might choose to take even more care, at 
even greater risk to themselves, than the minimally acceptable standard of care they owe 
their own civilians. And they might do so only when the endangered civilians are their 
own. In one sense, that creates a double standard: supererogatory, heroic risk-taking to 
spare their own civilians, and only minimally acceptable risk-taking to spare the enemy’s. 
Superficially, that looks like Kasher and Yadlin’s answer to question 2, rather than 
Margalit and Walzer’s: it acknowledges that it may be acceptable for soldiers to take 
more risks to spare friendly civilians than enemy civilians. But that is a mistake. Question 
2 is not about how much risk soldiers are permitted to take over and above the moral 
minimum—it is about the minimum itself, that is, how much risk they are required to 
take. It asks whether the minimally acceptable standard depends on who the civilians are. 
I believe this is Margalit and Walzer’s question as well, and it is that question that they, 
and I, answer no.14 
This point is crucial. The most powerful objection to Margalit and Walzer’s view 
is not philosophical at all. It is the gut-level sense that they must be wrong. Of course our 
soldiers can take greater risks for our own people than for the enemy’s. Anyone who 
thinks otherwise is living in a fantasy world where loyalties no longer matter.15 But to 
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 I am grateful to Tami Meisels for clarifying this crucial point for me. As she put it in an email, “of course 
in practice we will treat our own people with extra care (be more prepared to sacrifice, etc.), just as long as 
we treat civilians on the other side in a way that would be minimally acceptable even if they were our 
own.” 
15
 Azar Gat and Marty Lederman have pressed this point. A graphic illustration is a conversation I had with 
a stranger I happened to meet, who after finding out what I do for a living asked me what I was writing 
about. I answered: whether soldiers have to take the same risks for enemy civilians as their own civilians. 
His immediate response, before I said anything else: “I see what you’re saying, but I don’t agree.” 
Apparently, he thought it was preposterous even to ask the question. 
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repeat: taking heroic risks out of loyalty to your own people is not the issue. Rightly put, 
question 2 asks whether the minimally acceptable standard of care for enemy civilians is 
the same as the standard for our own civilians. It does not ask whether soldiers can 
selectively take greater risk than the minimally acceptable standard. This is not a merely 
verbal distinction. Recall that Kasher and Yadlin rank-order military priorities so that 
soldiers must place higher value on their own civilians than on themselves, but higher 
value on themselves than on enemy civilians. If the minimal standard of acceptable care 
soldiers owe enemy civilians is the same as for their own civilians, this rank-ordering is 
no longer possible. 
In what follows, I address both these questions. The arguments elaborate on the 
following main ideas: 
In response to the first question, I emphasize two chief points. First is the equal 
worth of military and civilian lives, which implies what might be called “risk 
egalitarianism”: that even if morality often permits people to transfer risk from 
themselves to others, transferring large risks to others in order to spare oneself from 
smaller risks is morally wrong, because indirectly it treats oneself as more valuable than 
the other. Second, I explore the possibility that soldiers belong to a profession in which 
honor may require them to take risks for civilians. This is particularly true when the risks 
to civilians come from the soldiers’ own violence. Kasher and Yadlin themselves think 
honorable soldiers must place the safety of their civilians above their own safety.  
In response to the second question—whether the minimally acceptable standard is 
different for friendly civilians and enemy civilians—I consider whether soldiers’ special 
obligation to protect their own people (not other people) creates a higher minimum 
13 
standard of care for their own people (and not other people). I answer no, because the 
special obligation is to protect their people from enemy violence, while the dilemma in 
the Basic Scenario is whether to protect civilians from the soldiers’ own violence. The 
responsibility to protect the innocent from violence of one’s own making is a universal, 
not a special, obligation. Thus, in both questions 1 and 2, the fact that soldiers themselves 
create the violence that endangers civilians plays a crucial role in my answers. 
In the concluding sections, I address two crucial loose ends. First is the question 
of whether soldiers might in fact be more valuable than civilians (including their own 
civilians) because they are not only human beings, but also “military assets.” I answer no, 
because this way of thinking involves illegitimate double counting of the soldier’s value, 
coupled with a refusal to double count the value of anyone else. Second is the related 
question of whether minimizing military casualties might turn out to be a military 
necessity because the civilian population is deeply casualty-averse, and the war effort 
requires their political support. Again I answer no.  
Who is entitled to talk about the issue? 
 Before saying anything further, I must confront the threshold question of whether 
I am entitled to say it. I am a civilian. I never served in the military, never witnessed 
combat, and in fact never came within a thousand miles of combat. Writing about warfare 
is always a perilous matter for civilians, and this issue is especially perilous. What could 
possibly give anyone sitting home in safety the right to opine on how much risk 
“morality” requires soldiers to assume? How can anyone who has never witnessed 
combat presume to write about it or even to think about it?  
14 
 Philosophers might invoke the term “epistemic privilege,” a concept that refers to 
who has the authority to enter knowledge claims and who does not. It might be argued 
that a civilian lacks that authority, that only a fighter has the epistemic privilege to say 
anything about the risks of fighting. 
 In a famous and angry essay titled “Thank God for the Atom Bomb,” Paul Fussell 
writes sarcastically about “the intellectual difficulties involved in imposing ex post facto 
a rational and even a genteel ethics on this event.”16 Nobody ignorant of “the unspeakable 
savagery of the Pacific war”17 has the epistemic privilege of debating whether ending it 
with the bomb was worth it. Here is how Fussell—an infantryman in the Pacific war—
dismisses J. Glenn Gray’s respected book The Warriors: 
During the war in Europe Gray was an interrogator in the Army 
Counterintelligence Corps, and in that capacity he experienced the war at Division 
level. There’s no denying that Gray’s outlook on everything was admirably noble, 
elevated, and responsible. After the war he became a much-admired professor of 
philosophy at Colorado College and an esteemed editor of Heidegger. But The 
Warriors, his meditation on the moral and psychological dimensions of modern 
soldiering, gives every sign of error occasioned by remoteness from experience. 
Division headquarters is miles—miles—behind the line where soldiers experience 
terror and madness and relieve those pressures by crazy brutality and sadism. 
                                                 
16
 Paul Fussell, “Thank God for the Atom Bomb,” in Thank God for the Atom Bomb and Other Essays 
(New York: Summit Books, 1988); available at 
http://crossroads.alexanderpiela.com/files/Fussell_Thank_God_AB.pdf, p. 21. 
17
 Ibid., p. 25. 
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Indeed, unless they actually encountered the enemy during the war, most 
“soldiers” have very little idea what “combat” was like.18 
So even a military man lacks the epistemic privilege to philosophize about combat unless 
he has seen it at its worst. Gray, on Fussell’s view, was little better than the scorned 
“chateau generals” of World War I, signing orders that sent millions to their deaths 
without ever changing out of their slippers. 
 There is much to Fussell’s outrage, and I agree wholeheartedly about the need for 
respectful humility on the part of myself or any other civilian who writes about war. But I 
don’t accept the conclusion that non-warriors are barred from discussing the moral 
dilemmas of warfare. That is for several reasons, some specific to the topic of risk and 
others more general. 
 1. The question before us is whether soldiers should assume risks they could 
avoid in order to minimize civilian casualties. Clearly that is not a matter of interest to 
soldiers alone. If they choose to take less risk, more civilians will lose their homes, their 
possessions, their loved ones, and their lives and limbs. Those civilians would be equally 
justified (or not) in protesting that nobody who isn’t a civilian caught in a battle space has 
the right to opine on the subject. That might exclude the soldiers, who from the civilian 
point of view are saving themselves in an event of their own making, at the expense of 
innocents. 
2. The claim of epistemic privilege to discuss soldiers’ duty rightfully applies 
only to experience-based moral claims. If, for example, the question before us is “what 
would it be reasonable to expect a soldier to do in a firefight?” civilians must listen 
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 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
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respectfully, even deferentially, to those who have experienced the circumstances. How 
else would a civilian know what is reasonable in a firefight?  
But arguments based on the rights of civilians don’t depend solely on the 
experience of those who jeopardize those rights. There is a delicate dialectical balance: 
we determine the rights of civilians in part by examining whether the correlative duties 
on soldiers are too much to ask; but we determine whether those duties are too much to 
ask—in other words, whether soldiers have a right not to have such asserted duties 
imposed on them—in part by examining whether relieving them of those duties would 
excessively imperil the rights of innocent civilians. 
3. Most basically, the claim of epistemic privilege wrongly supposes that we lack 
the essential capacity to imagine another human being’s situation. That capacity is the 
basis of morality, and the consequence of accepting the claim of epistemic privilege 
would be the abolition of moral judgment. 
Now Fussell’s point of view accepts that consequence, and his response seems to 
be that talking about combat in moral terms is, at bottom, absurd. In fact, no-one who 
hasn’t done it can imagine going on three hours of sleep a night for weeks, carrying a 90 
pound pack on your back, with your system in high alert, surrounded by near misses and 
the smell of dead bodies. These are circumstances so extreme that “the moral point of 
view” is, quite literally, words without meaning. 
If that were true, however, no society would be entitled to go to war. Soldiers are 
our soldiers, and when they transgress they do so in our name. We must independently 
take stock of what morality allows them to do because that determines what we are 
entitled to ask them to do. If morality cannot constrain our soldiers, it must constrain our 
17 
entitlement to send them into combat. Otherwise nobody—not the soldiers and not the 
civilians—could be held accountable for whatever “crazy brutality and sadism” takes 
place in wartime. The soldiers would be unaccountable because warfare is a morality-free 
pastime, and the civilians would be unaccountable because they haven’t asked the 
soldiers to do anything morality forbids. We would not even be entitled to call what the 
soldiers did brutality and sadism, for those are moral evaluations. 
The fact is that both soldiers and civilians largely accept that they can be held to 
account, morally and legally, for what they do. We have a moral vocabulary of excuses—
duress, heat of passion, mistake, mental incapacity—to acknowledge circumstances like 
those Fussell describes and mitigate harsh judgment. But importantly, we—soldiers as 
well as civilians—understand that none of these are blanket excuses that apply 
everywhere that soldiers fight. 
A first cut at the first question 
Of course it is important to know how soldiers think about our two questions in 
the Basic Scenario of Close Engagement versus Distant Engagement. During Israel’s 
2008 Gaza campaign (Operation Cast Lead), the New York Times reported that some 
Israeli units were “going in heavy” in response to hostile fire—meaning, in effect, 
choosing Distant Engagement by calling in air strikes in response to mortar fire. Without 
assuming that the reports were true—this is a matter of controversy—I asked some 
military ethicists at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point what they thought of “going 
in heavy” for the sake of force protection. I got the following responses, all from U.S. 
Army majors who fought in Iraq:19 
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1. “I am inclined to think that all soldiers (but especially volunteers) must be 
prepared to shoulder an increased risk to their own force protection when the 
situation is similar to what is happening in this fight. I am not comfortable with 
continually sending our fighting men and women into harm’s way without giving 
them the liberty to complete their mission. However, I am also leery of a policy 
that dictates ‘going in heavy’ and the associated tactics that are being reported 
knowing that there will be an increase in civilian harm.”  
2. “I think we are misguided in making force protection such a high priority. I feel 
it violates (or simply ignores?) the very essence of soldiering. The moral basis for 
soldiering is the protection of the innocent. ... While our legal contract is 
specifically with the American people, our moral justification for harming is in 
order to protect innocents from being harmed…. I am not willing to privilege 
military lives above civilian lives…. I am not sure that the soldier needs to treat 
his own life as any less valuable than that of a civilian, but I insist that he must 
not treat his own life as more valuable.”  
3. “I believe that force protection counts in JIB proportionality calculations 
provided that the force being protected is fighting for a just cause…. But I’m in 
agreement with [the previous respondent] that the lives of the IDF soldiers should 
not be weighted any more heavily than those of the civilians. If this is right, then 
it seems very unlikely that ‘going in heavy’ would ever be proportionate.” 
One response, from a U.S. Army colonel, was more hesitant, but only because of the 
separate issue that Hamas or Gazan civilians may have been responsible for the proximity 
of fighters and civilians: 
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4. “Soldiers take on that risk when they put on the uniform and join the military. 
But I don’t think anyone has worked out what to do when civilians do take on 
certain risks by assisting the enemy, or what to do when soldiers and civilians are 
indistinguishable and the enemy exploits that fact.” 
Obviously, this is a small and unrepresentative sample: all these respondents are career 
military officers with philosophical training who teach ethics. Despite their combat 
experience they might be targets for Paul Fussell’s sarcasms. They are not conscripts and 
not enlisted men. 
Yet their common themes don’t strike me as eccentric. All of them think soldiers 
must take on some risks to spare civilians. Two of them emphasize that soldier lives are 
worth neither more nor less than civilian lives. The first and second respondents evidently 
take higher-risk tactics as the moral baseline—the first refers to “an increase in civilian 
harm” using the lower-risk strategy, and the second believes that privileging force 
protection over non-combatant protection violates “the essence of soldiering.” 
These strike me as crucial points: first, that all lives are created equal and have 
equal worth; second, that accepting some extra risk to save civilians belongs to the 
vocational core of the soldier—in old fashioned but still relevant language, part of the 
soldier’s code of honor. 
Risk transfer ratios 
Let me try to flesh out these ideas. Recall that soldiers in the Basic Scenario, or 
those writing their ROEs, must choose between Close Engagement and Distant 
Engagement (“going in heavy”). Each tactic involves risks to soldiers and to civilians, 
which will only coincidentally be of the same magnitude: four risk levels in total. As I 
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argue below, the risk will normally be greater for civilians in the battle space than 
soldiers even under higher-risk tactics like Close Engagement, because soldiers are better 
equipped than civilians to safeguard themselves under either chosen tactic. 
Switching from one tactic to another affects both civilian and military risk. For 
the moment, let us set aside the absolute magnitude of the risks and consider how many 
units of risk soldiers are transferring to or from civilians for every unit they transfer from 
or to themselves. The difference between the risks to soldiers of Close Engagement 
compared with Distant Engagement is the marginal risk to soldiers; the difference 
between the risks to civilians of the two tactics is the marginal risk to civilians. The ratio 
of civilian marginal risk to military marginal risk is what I shall call the risk transfer 
ratio.20 This ratio seems relevant to the choice between Close Engagement and Distant 
Engagement. 
If the risk transfer ratio is greater than one it means that picking Distant 
Engagement transfers marginal risk to civilians at a greater than one-to-one ratio: soldiers 
are offloading larger risks to civilians in order to spare themselves smaller risks. And, 
conversely, a small risk transfer ratio means that soldiers choosing Close Engagement are 
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braving extra risks in order to spare civilians lesser risks. A risk transfer ratio of one-half 
means that if the military chooses Close Engagement, soldiers take on extra risk in order 
to spare civilians from marginal risk half as large. 
 I am not supposing that numbers like these can actually be calculated in real-
world cases. Obviously the real-life judgments of military and civilian risk will mostly be 
intuitive, qualitative, and context-dependent. To be sure, sometimes precise data may be 
available: a modern army very likely knows exactly how many casualties its troops have 
suffered in house-to-house fighting in recent weeks, exactly how often they have engaged 
an adversary going house-to-house as opposed to finding nothing more than a family of 
frightened civilians, and exactly how many civilians they have inadvertently harmed. 
Sometimes, therefore, it may be possible to quantify the risk troops face searching house-
to-house for weapons or enemy fighters—say, that the risk of death or serious injury to 
U.S. Marines was x% per house searched in Fallujah in November 2004, meaning that x 
Marines suffered injury per hundred houses searched. But in other situations, risk 
estimates will be imprecise and qualitative—“really dangerous,” “pretty risky,” “not 
much danger,” and in those cases numerical risk ratios are merely an expository device.  
Why bother? First, talking about risk transfer highlights the point that the military 
ethics problem—how much risk should soldiers assume to minimize civilian 
casualties?—is an instance of a more general question about risk trade-offs: when must 
one person assume risk to lower risk to another? Second, risk transfer ratios focus us not 
only on the direction of risk transfer—soldiers shifting risks from themselves to civilians 
or from civilians to themselves—but also on the exchange rate. Intuitively, the risk 
transfer ratio matters: it seems wrong for a soldier to expose innocent civilians to near-
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certain injury to spare himself a low probability risk. An exchange rate so lopsided 
suggests a radical and unjustified devaluation of enemy civilian life. Posing the problem 
as an issue about risk transfer highlights this central intuition—the intuition of the U.S. 
Army major who wrote “I am not sure that the soldier needs to treat his own life as any 
less valuable than that of a civilian, but I insist that he must not treat his own life as more 
valuable.” 
 To illustrate thinking with risk transfer ratios, let’s revisit Walzer’s example of 
Frank Richards, filling in some plausible, if imaginary and schematic, details. Richards 
must decide whether to call out his warning before dropping a hand grenade into a cellar. 
If the cellar contains French civilians, we will suppose that the situation is this: if 
Richards calls out the warning, they respond and survive; if he does not, they die or suffer 
injuries.  
Matters are more complicated if there are German soldiers in the cellar. They may 
surrender when they hear his warning, being frightened and not knowing how many 
British soldiers are standing outside. Or they may freeze with fear, and perish from his 
hand grenade. Even if they come out with guns blazing, Richards may win the firefight; 
or he may emerge unscathed because they fire blindly and flee. Taking all these 
possibilities into account, Richards may guess that his odds if he calls out the warning 
when German soldiers are hiding in the cellar are roughly fifty-fifty. If he calls out no 
warning, his odds of death or injury are (let’s say to keep matters simple) zero: the 
Germans will have no shot at him and the grenade will incapacitate them all. 
To summarize: By calling out the warning, Richards has increased his own 
chances of injury from zero to fifty percent, so the marginal risk is 0.5. Without calling 
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out the warning, he increases the chance of injury to civilians in the cellar from zero to 
one hundred percent, a marginal risk of 1. The risk transfer ratio is 2:1. 
 But we haven’t yet considered the odds that the people in the cellar are German 
soldiers rather than French civilians.21 If only one in ten of the occupied cellars have 
German soldiers in them, the remainder being cellars of French civilians, Richards’s odds 
of injury if he calls out the warning are much more favorable than fifty-fifty. In fact the 
odds of injury are only five percent (50% x 0.1). But the marginal risk to any civilian in 
the cellar if Richards calls out no warning remains one hundred percent. The real risk 
transfer ratio is not 2:1 but 20:1. We err if we think about risk solely by asking “What are 
my odds if the enemy is in there?” without also asking how often the enemy troops hide 
in cellars. It is a well-known fallacy of risk perception that people overestimate small 
risks because we focus on what would happen if the risk materializes, and lose focus on 
how improbable it is.  
Richards may know from past experience the odds that there are enemies in the 
cellar; it isn’t always the wisdom of hindsight. He may know, for example, that in the 
previous villages the Germans had invariably fled, and only one or two cellars had 
“orphan” soldiers hiding in them. Alternatively, he may know that in the previous 
villages the civilians had almost all evacuated, and the few who stayed behind never hid 
in their cellars—so the odds are overwhelming that anyone hiding in the cellar is a 
German soldier.  
Two points emerge from this example. First is one I mentioned above: a high risk 
transfer ratio suggests a radical and unjustified devaluation of enemy civilian life. This, it 
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seems to me, supports Walzer’s judgment that Frank Richards “was acting as a moral 
man ought to act.” 
Second, however, the example also cautions that risk transfer ratios alone tell us 
too little. If the odds of death or injury are fifty-fifty, it might be wrong to criticize Frank 
Richards for deciding against warnings, because running a fifty-fifty chance of death or 
injury is too much to ask of a soldier. A five percent chance of death or injury, while 
surely significant, may not be too much to ask of a soldier if it saves innocent civilians. 
This observation leads to an important qualification to Walzer’s conclusion that Frank 
Richards’s conduct “is not an example of fighting heroically, above and beyond the call 
of duty, but simply of fighting well.” Whether Richards was fighting well or heroically 
depends on the absolute magnitude of the risk he was running as well as the risk transfer 
ratio. Walzer’s conclusion would not follow if the risk is too great; surely Richards would 
be acting above and beyond the call of duty if the marginal risk in calling out the warning 
is really as high as fifty percent.22 
How much risk? 
 Let us turn to our first question. What level of risk must soldiers assume to 
minimize casualties among their own civilians?  Margalit and Walzer admit that they 
can’t answer that question with any precision. They don’t have to take suicidal 
risks, certainly; nor do they have to take risks that make the [mission] impossibly 
difficult. … But merely “not intending” the civilian deaths, while knowing that 
they will occur, is not a position that can be vindicated …. [The army’s] soldiers 
must, by contrast with its enemies, intend not to kill civilians, and that active 
                                                 
22
  Walzer agrees that the level of risk matters (private communication), and adds that he was assuming that 
the risk to Richards in the actual example was minimal. 
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intention can be made manifest only through the risks the soldiers themselves 
accept in order to reduce the risks to civilians.23 
I agree that no precise answer can be given to the “how much risk” question, as well as 
the point that the risks needn’t be suicidal or make the mission impossibly difficult. In the 
Basic Scenario, though, I take it that neither of these extreme conditions obtains even if 
the army chooses Close Engagement over Distant Engagement. If so, is there anything 
more we can say about the question of risk? 
 In ordinary civilian life, we seldom insist that people take on personal risk to 
reduce risk to others. If I buy the largest SUV I can find because I think (correctly) that it 
offers more safety in a collision, I diminish my own danger but increase the danger to 
people in small cars, who are more likely to be crushed in a collision with my Toyota 
Leviathan than if I were driving a smaller car. But no one suggests that I shouldn’t buy 
the Leviathan for that reason. People cannot transfer risk to others by wrongful means—
grabbing another pedestrian to shield yourself from gunfire on a city street—but buying a 
big car is not wrongful.24 Unfortunately, such thoughts will not get us far in the military 
cases. In the Basic Scenario the question is precisely whether choosing Distant 
Engagement over Close Engagement is wrongful. 
A better civilian analogy would be to people engaged in ultra-hazardous activities 
like blasting or shipping dangerous chemicals. If something goes amiss, and the person 
imposing the hazard must choose between taking risks on herself to control the danger 
she has caused or fleeing the scene and letting the risks fall on innocent bystanders, the 
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latter seems pretty clearly immoral. Even if the accident was not her fault, she is 
responsible for creating the situation in which either she or the bystander must run risks. 
She caused the danger, and causation matters. This is the deeply embedded intuition in 
historical cases about strict liability, like the 1868 tort chestnut Rylands v. Fletcher: 
“When one person, in managing his own affairs, causes, however innocently, damage to 
another, it is obviously only just that he should be the party to suffer.”25 In Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s words, “In the cases put, the plaintiff has done nothing; the defendant, 
on the other hand, has chosen to act. As between the two, the party whose voluntary 
conduct has caused the damage should suffer, rather than the one who has had no share in 
producing it.”26 The tort analogy is imperfect, because our subject is who must bear risk, 
not who must bear the cost of damage. But they are closely connected—exposure to risk 
is a kind of damage. Notice that both Holmes and Lord Cranswell put their point in terms 
of who should suffer, not merely who should pay. Causation matters especially when it 
involves physical battery. Cross-cultural survey studies of problems in which an agent 
must choose whether to save five innocent lives at the cost of one reveal that the manner 
in which the chooser causes the one innocent person to die matters immensely in people’s 
moral evaluation of the choice: the more counts of battery the chooser commits in 
rescuing the five, the more hesitant subjects are to agree that it is morally permissible, 
even though the numbers (five saved, one killed) are the same in all the cases. The 
intuition that causation matters seems to be part of human nature, perhaps innately so.27 
                                                 
25
 Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868)(Cranswell, L.). 
26
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (1881), p. 84. It is also true that in common law, a 
defendant can escape liability by showing that was justified in the course of action that caused the harm. 
But this does not affect the line of argument I present here, because the very issue on the table is whether 
fighting in a way that fobs off soldier risk onto innocent civilians is justified. 
27
 John Mikhail, The Elements of Moral Cognition (Cambridge UP: 2011). 
27 
Causation is not the only way a person can acquire responsibility to accept risks 
rather than transferring them. Some professions include risk taking in their vocational 
core—think of police, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel treating contagious 
diseases. Of course, nobody is drafted to become a policeman or firefighter, but it seems 
to me that something more than consent explains why firefighters carry out their 
obligations. The reason is that it is what honorable firefighters do, and I am confident that 
their sense of honor, and not their contract with the fire department, is what motivates 
them. A dramatic illustration is the heroism of the “Fukushima 50”—the Japanese 
nuclear workers fighting to prevent the tsunami-damaged nuclear reactor from melting 
down. The mother of one worker tearfully told reporters: “My son and his colleagues 
have discussed it at length and they have committed themselves to die if necessary to 
save the nation. He told me they have all accepted that they will all probably die from 
radiation sickness in the short term or cancer in the long-term.”28 This level of heroism 
surely transcends moral obligation; but their sense of professional honor will be 
recognizable to anyone in a high-risk public profession, including soldiers.  
Translating these thoughts into the more antiseptic language I introduced earlier 
in the paper, we should regard the choice of tactics as a form of risk transfer between 
soldiers and non-combatants—a kind of trade-off between lives and lives. If so, the 
admonition that all lives are created equal suggests that soldiers must not choose tactics 
with a risk transfer ratio greater than one, nor need they accept a choice with a risk 
transfer ratio less than one. That would be the simplest form of risk egalitarianism. 
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But the vocational core of soldiering (“the very essence of soldiering,” in the 
words of one of the officers to whom I posed my question) suggests something different: 
that, to protect a civilian from their own violence, soldiers must accept risk transfer ratios 
less than one, perhaps significantly less than one. And that is as true for enemy civilians 
as their own. 
How much extra risk soldiers must shoulder is, as Margalit and Walzer insist, not 
a question susceptible to precise answers, or for that matter general answers. More 
importantly, it seems to me that this is an experienced-based question in which 
knowledge of the conditions of combat will play a role.29 But it does seem to me that we 
can say something about the Basic Scenario. 
One conclusion is that neither Close Engagement nor Distant Engagement 
necessarily represents the baseline or default position. The baseline risk, representing the 
quantum of extra risk that a nation’s soldiers can be expected to take on to minimize 
casualties to their own civilians, may be less than Close Engagement in some especially 
desperate circumstances, for example, when an embattled and surrounded unit is fighting 
for its life; it will almost always be more than Distant Engagement. A state’s army, 
dedicated to the protection of its own civilians, would not obliterate entire “friendly” 
buildings containing co-nationals from a distance in order to safeguard its soldiers. 
The decisive fact is that even in Close Engagement, soldiers’ risks are far less 
than those of non-combatants. Professional soldiers are better armed and armored, better 
trained, better disciplined, better conditioned, better able to function in coordinated 
teams, and better supported than their adversaries, including in the crucial matter of 
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medical care if they are wounded. Everyone in their units is pledged never to leave them 
fallen on the field; their buddies have their backs. In every respect, they are simply better 
able to protect themselves than are non-combatants (or even irregular adversaries). 
Almost certainly, the risk transfer ratio in choosing Distant Engagement is greater than 
one, probably far greater, because the systematic advantages of trained modern armies 
guarantee that the marginal risk they assume by choosing Close Engagement is small 
relative to the risk they spare civilians.30 
Their civilians and ours 
Whatever the minimal acceptable care soldiers must take to spare “friendly” 
civilians, we can take it as a baseline for addressing the question of risk transfer to enemy 
civilians. Is the risk transfer ratio different when the civilians are “theirs” rather than 
“ours”? That is: can an army endanger “their” civilians more than “ours” to achieve force 
protection? Margalit and Walzer answer no: what matters is not who the civilians are, but 
only the fact that they are civilians, that is, non-combatants. Kasher and Yadlin disagree. 
For them, sparing “our” citizens, including soldiers, is more important than sparing 
“their” civilians. 
The obvious reason for this view is that citizens have special obligations to 
fellow-citizens that they don’t have to others—what philosophers call “associative 
obligations.” For example, Iddo Porat (in a fine recent paper on preferring one’s own 
civilians), argues that I am entitled to take extra risks to save people with whom I have a 
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special relationship: “people you hold dear, such as family members.”31 He asks: “How 
far can this justification be extended? Should it apply also to second degree relatives, 
friends, countrymen?...[T]here seems to be an intuitive pull towards the view that 
preferring along the lines of one’s co-civilians is not simply discriminating at whim.” 
Porat quotes Thomas Hurka for a similar position: “The relations among citizens of a 
nation are not as close as between parents and children, and the partiality they justify is 
not as strong. But common sense still calls for some partiality toward fellow citizens and 
certainly demands that partiality of governments.”32 
Porat starts with our justifiable preference for “people you hold dear,” and draws 
conclusions about co-citizens from intuitions about these cases. However, natural as the 
analogy feels, it is too hasty. Most of my co-citizens are not people I hold dear, certainly 
not in the sense that I hold my wife, son, and daughter dear. I know nothing about 
99.99% of them, I am relatively sure that even if I knew them I wouldn’t hold most of 
them dear, and in fact I am sure that there are many I would dislike or fear. Nothing about 
co-citizens follows from anything we might say about “people you hold dear.”33  
What about Hurka’s assertion that “common sense...calls for some partiality 
toward fellow citizens”?  The answer is that common sense is slippery. Suppose I agree 
that common sense justifies partiality toward fellow citizens in some things. For example, 
as an American tourist I might feel a special impetus to help out a fellow-American in 
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distress in a foreign city where I am traveling; a greater sense of obligation to rebuild 
New Orleans than Port au Prince; and, more relevant to the topic, a greater sense of 
obligation to send U.S. troops to rescue captured Americans than captured Belgians.  
On the other hand, I don’t feel any partiality toward fellow citizens in many other 
respects. If, for example, a U.S. national and a foreign national rob a bank, I don’t think 
the U.S. national should get a shorter jail sentence. In a lawsuit between a U.S. national 
and a foreign national, I have no a priori partiality toward the U.S. national. If I donate 
blood at my local hospital, I have no preference that it be given to a U.S. citizen rather 
than a foreign citizen being treated in the hospital—indeed, my common sense concludes 
that any American who donates blood insisting that it be given only to a U.S. national is a 
creepy jingoist if not a racist. I would be surprised and disappointed if Porat and 
Hurka disagree. Any plausible theory of associative obligation must concede that 
preferences for fellow citizens do not exist across the board in human interactions. 
Associative obligations do not translate to generalized nepotism. 
What is true for personal obligations is true as well for governments. If a U.S. 
statute assigned different criminal sentences to bank robbers based on nationality, or 
declared that the burden-of-proof rules in a civil lawsuit should always favor U.S. 
nationals over foreign nationals, or legislated that donated blood be given only to U.S. 
nationals, my common sense declares all those laws immoral, and my “intuitive pull” is 
disgust that anyone would favor such legislation. 
Assuming that my intuitions are not eccentric on these matters—that my “sense” 
is indeed “common”— it appears that “common sense” favors partiality for co-civilians 
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on some issues and not others. Which is which? Proponents of associative obligations 
seem to presume the risk issue is one favoring partiality for co-civilians. But why? 
One answer is that institutions like those administering criminal punishment, civil 
trials, and medical care have well-recognized obligations of impartiality; and perhaps that 
is what drives our “impartialist” intuitions in the examples, not any sense of 
egalitarianism between countrymen and strangers. Courts of law are morally required to 
administer justice impartially, and hospitals work under a parallel obligation to treat the 
sick no matter who they are. Armies, one might object, are entirely different.34 Protecting 
their own citizens is why armies exist, and that obligation has nothing impartial about it. 
As Porat writes, “a soldier’s job is not to protect any civilian, qua civilian, but only to 
protect his co-civilians.”35 
However, this equivocates on two senses of “protect”: to protect civilians against 
enemy violence, and to protect civilians from one’s own violence. Of course the soldier’s 
job exists to protect co-civilians, not foreign civilians, against their enemies (leaving 
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aside humanitarian interventions). But it would completely beg the question to assert that 
the soldier’s obligation to protect civilians against the soldier’s own violence runs only to 
fellow citizens. The question on the table is whether soldiers must take added risks to 
avoid becoming “innocent” killers of civilians. The idea that one has a greater obligation 
to avoid killing co-nationals than to avoid killing foreigners seems akin to the examples I 
gave above where nationality preference is morally objectionable—on a par with 
asserting that you don’t have to drive as carefully in a foreign country as you do at home 
because the pedestrians aren’t your own countrymen.36 
The universal negative duty not to inflict violence on the innocent is equivalent to 
the positive duty to take at least some baseline level of precaution against inflicting 
violence unintentionally on the innocent, and is therefore also universal and impartial. If 
the baseline level of precaution—the minimally acceptable care soldiers owe their own 
civilians—involves risk, then that same level of risk-taking is what they owe enemy 
civilians. Notably, the impartial character of the obligation to avoid unintended harm to 
civilians is the conventional understanding of the principle of distinction, as well as the 
understanding embedded in the law of war. 
A skeptic may respond that this argument proves too much. If the universal 
negative obligation to avoid harming innocent enemy civilians really trumps the special 
obligation of soldiers to protect their own countrymen, protecting countrymen by waging 
war would be impossible: war inevitably violates rights and harms the innocent. We 
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should be wary of an argument about how soldiers may wage just war that yields 
pacifism as its conclusion. 
Pressing this point, Seth Lazar identifies a dubious premise of the argument: that 
universal negative obligations automatically outweigh special obligations. If that were 
true, Lazar argues, we would have to give up too much, for example humanitarian 
military intervention to halt massive human rights violations. Many people advocate a 
general responsibility to protect (“R2P”, in the current jargon of international law) that 
might permit humanitarian interventions. If so, general obligations to protect can 
sometimes outweigh negative obligations not to harm. And surely a special obligation to 
protect one’s own fellows may outweigh a general obligation to protect strangers. It 
follows that the special obligation to protect one’s own fellows can outweigh negative 
obligations not to harm.37 Perhaps, then, the negative universal duty not to inflict violence 
on the innocent is not as powerful as I have suggested. Perhaps, in fact, it is weaker than 
the soldier’s obligation to protect his or her fellow citizens. 
Remember, however, that we are not talking about a choice between risk-taking to 
spare enemy civilians and protecting one’s own citizens. In the Basic Scenario, the choice 
is not a stark either-or between Distant Engagement or pacifism. There is a third 
alternative: Close Engagement. Close Engagement, we may suppose, represents the 
minimally acceptable standard of care soldiers must take for their own civilians; and no 
associative obligation prevents them from taking the same standard of care for enemy 
civilians. Lazar’s argument, forceful as it may be against pacifism and the premises that 
imply it, has little bearing on the question of whether soldiers may take fewer risks to 
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minimize casualties among enemy civilians than morality requires them to take for their 
own civilians. To that question, the answer remains no.  
This entire line of argument will seem perverse to those to whom it’s obvious that 
we can take more risks to protect those we care about than those we don’t. If soldiers take 
heroic risks for their countrymen, can it really be that they are required to brave the same 
risks for enemy civilians? If parents take heroic risks for their own children, must they 
take the same risks for all children? 
The answer is “of course not.” Frank Richards could permissibly go to even more 
extraordinary lengths of risk-taking if he feared that his own children might be in the 
cellars. But, as I argued earlier, this double standard applies only to risks above the 
baseline of minimally acceptable care—supererogatory, heroic, risks. I am not arguing 
that heroes must be equal-opportunity heroes. That would be ridiculous. The argument is 
that the minimally acceptable level of risk taking to minimize civilian casualties—the 
risks that, in Walzer’s words, come under the heading not of fighting heroically but of 
fighting well—is the same regardless who those civilians are. 
Soldiers as “assets” and as citizens 
A different objection to this line of thought comes from the idea that in an 
important sense soldiers’ lives are more important than civilians’: not only does a soldier 
have the same fundamental personal interest as the civilian in surviving, the soldier’s 
survival is also crucial to the mission. As soldiers sometimes put it, they are “assets.” Of 
course, they are assets only to their own side, and whether being a military asset is an 
overall moral plus or a minus depends on the justice of their cause.38 But even waiving 
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this hesitation and supposing that their fight is a just one, the objection fails. It amounts to 
a kind of double counting: according to this objection, not only is the soldier’s life as 
valuable as the civilian’s, the soldier automatically gets extra credit for being an asset. 
But to precisely the extent that a soldier is an “asset,” that personal interest is set to one 
side. As a military asset, the soldier can be required to die in the line of duty if necessary. 
If, for example, choosing Close Engagement over Distant Engagement would help the 
cause (as under counterinsurgency doctrine, where minimizing enemy civilian casualties 
is central to the strategy), the soldier would be duty-bound to carry out the orders for 
Close Engagement, even if it increases personal risk for the soldier. That is precisely 
what it means to be an asset. Conversely, to give full sway to the soldier’s personal 
interest in survival is to regard him or her as something different in kind from a military 
asset. To borrow Kant’s distinction: as a human being, soldiers are ends in themselves, 
possessing a dignity not a price; they are intrinsic sources of value. As an asset, a soldier 
is merely a means, whose life could be the price paid for victory, and whose value is 
instrumental, not intrinsic. 
A consequentialist might be unmoved by the Kantian distinction and reply that to 
be an “asset” means, concretely, to be in a position to save even more lives, including 
civilian lives. Doesn’t that make the soldier worth more than a civilian, without the 
fallacy of double counting?39 The answer is no. The assumption itself is incurably 
speculative, and once we travel down the road of speculation we cannot do it only for the 
soldier. We must also do it for the civilians who the soldier unintentionally kills or 
injures. The soldier may save additional lives—but of course he may not. He may never 
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fight in another battle, if the war or his term of service ends. In reality, few soldiers can 
claim to have personally saved even one human life. On the other side of the ledger, the 
civilian casualty may be a surgeon who, over his or her career, would have saved 
thousands. Or a child who would have grown up to cure cancer, or negotiate a lasting 
peace. Or a mother, whose incapacitating brain injury ruins the lives of her eight children. 
Or none of the above. My own view is that we mustn’t go down this road at all, because 
it is all make-believe.  
Viewed purely as human beings, ends-in-themselves not “assets,” soldier’s lives 
are obviously as worth fighting for as anyone else’s. This may lead to the view that force 
protection is an autonomous goal of warfare; Kasher and Yadlin argue this way when 
they point out that the Israeli Defense Forces are charged with protecting Israeli citizens, 
and these include the IDF soldiers themselves.40 But this does not make the soldier more 
important than the civilian, and in proportionality calculations it can never justify actions 
with a risk transfer ratio greater than one. Nor, of course, can the proportionality calculus 
add protecting soldiers viewed purely as human beings to the military importance of 
protecting assets—that would again commit the fallacy of double counting, where the 
soldier counts once as a military asset and once as a citizen. 
Those persuaded by Kasher and Yadlin that the soldier’s citizenship matters 
decisively may try again. If a soldier faces an unavoidable tragic choice between 
unintentionally harming two people, one a fellow citizen and the other an enemy citizen, 
can’t the soldier—indeed, mustn’t the soldier—harm the latter rather than the former? To 
say otherwise would mean that fellow citizenship counts for nothing. Suppose, then, that 
the answer is yes. A fortiori, the answer will be yes if the citizen the soldier saves 
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happens to be herself. It follows that the soldier can justifiably rank self-protection above 
protection of the enemy civilian, and for just the reason Kasher and Yadlin state: the 
soldier is a citizen of the state, and their own citizens rightly matter more to the military 
than other peoples' citizens. 
Stated more carefully, though, the argument dissolves. It turns on an example in 
which that the only difference between the two people is their nationality. If so, the 
correct formulation would run along the following lines: “If a soldier faces an 
unavoidable choice between unintentionally harming two civilians, one a fellow citizen 
and the other an enemy civilian, can’t the soldier—indeed, mustn’t the soldier—harm the 
latter rather than the former?” The catch lies in the word “civilian,” which the first 
formulation of the argument left out. By leaving it out, the first formulation invites us to 
consider the soldier solely as a citizen, no different than a civilian citizen; it glosses over 
the fact that the citizen-soldier is a soldier. But that ignores precisely the decisive 
difference: the soldier, not the civilian, is engaged in violence, and the soldier's violence 
is what forces the deadly risk trade-off.  
To be sure, a soldier who fights justly in a just war is doing nothing wrong, or so 
we should assume. But the question on the table is whether exposing innocent enemy 
civilians to more risk than the minimally acceptable care for friendly civilians is fighting 
justly. It would simply beg the question to assume that the answer is yes, and if we make 
no such assumption, the argument collapses. 
Kasher and Yadlin’s argument that soldiers may safeguard themselves over 
enemy civilians because they are citizens, and therefore they belong to the group they are 
charged with protecting, is a bizarre one in any event. It yields the implication that 
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citizen-soldiers have lesser in bello obligations than non-citizens in their own army. 
Many states permit non-nationals to serve in their militaries; others hire mercenaries or 
other private security contractors, not all of whom are fellow citizens. It would be odd 
indeed if the citizen-soldier has lesser duties of care to innocent enemy civilians than 
mercenaries have—but that is what Kasher and Yadlin’s argument about citizen 
preference would imply. 
None of the above denies that soldier lives count fully in the proportionality 
calculus; on the contrary, I accept force protection as a “concrete and direct military 
advantage” (to use the law-of-war phrase). What I deny is that protecting a soldier 
matters more than protecting an enemy civilian. 
Political necessity as military necessity 
Further difficult questions are whether the political need for force protection can 
make it an independent strategic goal of military operations, and whether that confers 
extra weight to the “concrete and definite military advantage” of reducing your own 
side’s casualties. Governments sometimes face intense casualty-aversion in their 
electorates. It seems clear that President Bill Clinton would not have intervened in 
Kosovo if doing so required boots on the ground rather than an air campaign. There was 
simply no political stomach for boots on the ground after the “Blackhawk Down” debacle 
in the U.S. Operation Gothic Serpent in Somalia, particularly because after the first Gulf 
War the American public expected easy victories with very few casualties. For Clinton, 
maximum force protection was not simply incidental to the Kosovo intervention: it was 
one of the goals of the intervention. Reportedly, force protection was also an important 
political goal in the Israeli Operation Cast Lead, because of the twin traumas of the 2006 
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Lebanon war and the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit. Force protection becomes a goal when a 
military must not only win a war, but win it without the enemy laying a glove on us, to 
placate an uneasy public that might otherwise not support the war. The question is 
whether this goal can be satisfied at the price of greater damage to enemy civilians. 
Legally, the answer is clearly no: proportionality doctrines weigh unintended 
civilian damage against the importance of military goals, not political goals. But that is 
not the end of the story, because of a classic argument that political goals can be military 
goals as well. From Clausewitz on, we have understood that military victory means 
breaking the adversary’s political will to fight, and losing your own will to fight means 
military defeat. Rome won the Second Punic War because the Senate stubbornly refused 
to negotiate even after Hannibal annihilated Rome’s legions in the biggest one-day loss 
of life in military history. North Vietnam prevailed over the United States because its will 
remained unbroken while the U.S. public lost its stomach to continue. In this sense, 
political will is a military necessity, and if keeping casualties very low is essential to 
maintaining political will, the Clausewitzian will draw the obvious conclusion about the 
military necessity of keeping casualties low. 
One rejoinder might be that a nation unwilling to accept casualties has no moral 
right to demand military victory; but that is wrong, because the justice of the cause bears 
no necessary connection to people’s willingness to die for it. In fact, the people might 
argue that precisely because their cause is just—they are the invaded, not the invaders—
they have every right to keep their casualties as low as possible. 
However, this way of thinking ignores the other half of the problem, namely that 
in order to keep up the public’s own morale in a just war, enemy civilians must die in 
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greater numbers. For this reason, the answer to the question whether the political need for 
low casualties matters in the morality of war must be no. Otherwise, the more faint-
hearted the public, the more their soldiers would be entitled to inflict collateral damage 
on enemy civilians. The moral hazard and perverse incentives would be intolerable; 
hence the rule is intolerable. This is why the legal test for proportionality weighs civilian 
damage against “concrete and direct military advantage,” not the indirect and intangible 
military advantage grounded in civilian morale. To make the law or morality of war 
hostage to political will, so that the less will to fight a country has, the less moral and 
legal obligation it has to fight well, would mean the end of the law and morality of war. 
 
APPENDIX: HOW THE PROBLEM IS REPRESENTED IN THE LAW OF WAR 
The problem of how much risk soldiers must take to minimize civilian casualties 
is not one that the law of war speaks to directly, but it receives indirect representation in 
the law of in bello proportionality. Civilians may never be directly targeted by militaries, 
but it is inevitable that in wartime civilians and civilian objects will be harmed, 
sometimes by accident but sometimes in full knowledge that lawful military targets are in 
close enough proximity to civilians that they will become—in the familiar euphemism—
collateral damage. The law of war deems this permissible if the unintended damage is not 
“excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage” gained by the attack. 
Call this phrase the proportionality formula. The specific standards appear in two articles 
of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (Articles 51 and 57). These articles 
declare attacks that violate the proportionality formula to be indiscriminate, and enjoin 
that “constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian 
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objects.” Planners must “do everything feasible” to ensure that targets are military not 
civilian. They must “take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of 
attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.” Planners must refrain from 
attacks that “may be expected” to cause disproportionate civilian damage, and they must 
discontinue an attack if it “becomes apparent” that the targets are not military or that the 
attack will cause disproportionate civilian damage. Finally, planners must warn civilians 
in advance of attacks that may affect them, “unless circumstances do not permit.”41  
 Notice two points about these standards. First, Article 57 requires militaries to 
take all “feasible” precautions to verify the nature of the targets, and then to take “all 
feasible precautions” in the choice of means and methods of attack to minimize civilian 
damage. The requirement of minimizing civilian damage seems on its face to forbid 
tactics that raise civilian risk when it is feasible not to.  
However, the word “feasible” can be understood in more than one way, and its 
ambiguity means that the law yields no determinate answer to the question of risk. 
Presumably “feasible” does not mean “technologically feasible, regardless of how much 
risk the precautions require soldiers to take and how damaging those precautions are to 
their military mission.” Feasibility must mean something more than technological 
feasibility. But it also cannot mean that precautions are infeasible if taking them might 
ever-so-slightly increase soldiers’ risk or risk to their mission. That interpretation would 
hollow out the prohibition and leave it nearly empty. The problem lies in the wide space 
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between the extremes of requiring armies to do everything technologically feasible to 
avoid civilian damage and requiring nothing that might increase the risk to the mission 
even slightly. 
During the treaty negotiations, some delegations asserted that “feasibility” meant 
“everything that was practicable or practically possible, taking into account all the 
circumstances at the time of the attack, including those relevant to the success of military 
operations.”42 The ICRC’s commentary on Article 57 rejects this interpretation: “The 
last-mentioned criterion seems too broad….There might be reason to fear that by 
invoking the success of military operations in general, one might end up by neglecting 
the humanitarian obligations prescribed here.”43 The “feasibility” standard offers no 
concrete guidance about what level of risk soldiers must take to verify that their targets 
are not civilians, or to choose more discriminate but less reliably lethal means and 
methods of attack. Presumably, the drafters left matters vague because the parties never 
agreed how feasible a precaution must be. 
 Second, the rules repeatedly use the proportionality formula, prohibiting damage 
that is “excessive in relation to the concrete and definite military advantage anticipated.” 
Obviously, the words “concrete and direct” are there to do some work. Including them 
rules out arguments that weigh damage to enemy civilians against the value of the entire 
war effort, in which case civilian damage, even on a vast scale, might not be deemed 
disproportionate. In the words of the ICRC commentary, “The expression ‘concrete and 
direct’ was intended to show that the advantage concerned should be substantial and 
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relatively close, and that advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would 
only appear in the long term should be disregarded.”44 
 So too with the adjective “military” in “military advantage.” As discussed above, 
it may be politically crucial to governments that casualties be kept as low as possible, 
because the public is casualty averse and might oppose a military operation with more 
than a handful of casualties, or vote out a government that launches a controversial war 
unless it is nearly casualty-free. These considerations could require nearly absolute force 
protection—a zero-risk policy—justifying massive casualties among enemy civilians. But 
they are considerations of political, not military advantage. 
 These points lead to my main proposition about how the law of war represents the 
issue of risk-taking to protect civilians: it maps the issue into the question of what level of 
force protection counts as a “concrete and direct military advantage” in the 
proportionality formula.  
 Obviously, force protection has military salience, and Additional Protocol I was 
not a suicide pact. But the treaty language indicates (though not in so many words) that 
the anticipated risk transfer ratio can never be greater than one-to-one—that is why it is a 
proportionality standard. If the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by 
choosing one tactic over another (like Distant Engagement over Close Engagement) is 
saving x soldier lives, it cannot be pursued by causing more than x anticipated but 
unintended additional civilian deaths. In the usual situation, where military organizations 
are exposing civilians to greater risk than they are sparing themselves, they must protect 
their forces by abstaining from operations that force existential tradeoffs, not by forging 
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ahead with the operation but placing more weight on military lives than the lives of 
civilians. 
 A risk transfer ratio of one-to-one is clearly the upper bound permitted by the 
proportionality formula. The other treaty language quoted above—about taking constant 
care to spare civilians, doing everything feasible to spare civilians, and warning 
civilians—strongly suggests, without explicitly requiring, that military organizations 
should do better than that, erring on the side of lower rather than higher risk transfer 
ratios; and military honor may require more. But the law does not require military honor. 
 Regrettably, the International Criminal Court’s version of the “concrete and 
direct” standard muddies the standard by weakening it dramatically. The Rome Statute of 
the ICC prohibits: 
[i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which 
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated.45 
I have italicized two words that significantly change the standard from that in AP I. First, 
the ICC substitutes “clearly excessive” for “excessive.” The ICC version is no longer a 
proportionality standard at all: in effect, it permits disproportionate (i.e., excessive) 
civilian damage so long as it is not “clearly excessive.” Second, the added word “overall” 
in the phrase “overall military advantage” weakens the force of “concrete and direct.” 
The most natural construction of AP I’s “concrete and direct” standard is that those doing 
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the proportionality assessment can balance civilian damage in an operation only against 
the military value of that specific operation. If you are shelling an apartment building 
because an enemy mortar shell came from its courtyard, the possible civilian casualties 
can be weighed only against the military advantage of taking out the mortar. The ICC’s 
phrasing says that civilian damage in an operation can be weighed against the overall 
military advantage of the plan of which the operation is a part—and that seems to permit 
more dead civilians. Thus, in two ways the ICC has weakened the protection of civilians 
against collateral damage and strengthened the value of force protection. 
 The reason the Rome Statute changed the proportionality formula is that it is 
defining a criminal offense, and drafters apparently thought that fairness to the accused 
requires a less stringent standard.46 It follows, however, that the Rome Statute’s standard 
should not be taken to represent the standard of rightful conduct; to think otherwise 
would be to commit what Henry Shue and I have labeled the forensic fallacy of mistaking 
the extra margin of safety for defendants' rights that criminal statutes must provide for 
accurate definitions of right and wrong conduct.47 
 At present, this discrepancy between AP I and the Rome Statute has minimal legal 
effect. AP I has more than 160 states-parties, and they include all but two of the hundred-
plus members of the ICC—and those two have no militaries.48 Any state that is party to 
both AP I and the Rome Treaty must follow the more exacting standard of AP I, unless 
the ICC standard supersedes that of AP I. But it doesn’t: nothing in the Rome Statute’s 
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definition of crimes “shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or 
developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.”49 The wide 
acceptance of the AP I proportionality standard, including by states that did not ratify AP 
I, means that it has become customary international law. Thus, it seems fair to say that 
the ICC’s standard has not changed the basic AP I standard in international law. On the 
other hand, the ICC’s standard, not that of AP I, governs ICC prosecutions, so the Rome 
Statute unquestionably weakens accountability for the war crime of knowingly causing 
disproportionate civilian damage. And if state practice ever begins to evolve in the 
direction of a more permissive standard, the ICC’s statute might be retroactively 
interpreted as evidence that the customary law of war is changing. 
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